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Abstract 
 
A person may acquire rights or be released from obligations 
through the passage of time. This is known as prescription. The 
objective of prescription is to achieve legal certainty and finality 
in the relationship between a debtor and a creditor, with the 
focus on protecting a debtor (consumer) against the unfairness 
of having to defend old claims. Old claims are therefore after the 
elapsing of specific time periods extinguished through 
prescription. A debtor must then specifically raise prescription as 
a defence against claims from creditors based on prescribed 
debts. The prescription of consumer debts is regulated by the 
National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (when the credit agreement falls 
under the NCA) and the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. The 
Prescription Act generally regulates all aspects of the 
prescription, which would also include consumer debts, while 
section 126B of the National Credit Act regulates and prohibits 
certain practices related to prescription, such as the selling of 
prescribed consumer debts or the continued collection or re-
activation of prescribed consumer debts. In this article several 
practical aspects related to prescription and the National Credit 
Act are discussed, such as the impact of non-compliance with 
section 96 and section 129(1)(a) of the NCA on prescription. 
Section 126B is specifically analysed, and the question whether 
section 126B absolutely prohibits certain abusive practices 
related to the prescription of consumer debts is answered. 
Several shortcomings of the current legislation are also pointed 
out. In this article some aspects of the draft Prescription Bill 
proposed by the South African Law Reform Commission are also 
considered. In particular, we focus on the impact the Bill may 
have on the consumer-credit industry. 
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1  Introduction and background 
A person may acquire rights or be released from obligations through the 
passage of time. This is known as prescription. Through acquisitive 
prescription a person acquires rights and through extinctive prescription a 
person may be released from obligations through the passage of time.1 The 
focus in this article is on extinctive prescription. 
The underlying policies and justifications for the prescription of debts 
(extinctive prescription) do not always seem so clear or fair.2 In short, 
extinctive prescription entails that if a creditor neglects to claim payment on 
a debt for a certain period of time, the debt will ultimately be extinguished 
(or fall away). Generally, the main purpose of extinctive prescription is the 
achievement of legal certainty and finality in the relationship between a 
debtor and a creditor, with the focus on protecting a debtor against the 
unfairness of having to defend old claims.3 Prescription aims to give legal 
certainty to a debtor, in the sense that he (in this text, words in the masculine 
gender are to be taken as being inclusive of the feminine gender) will know 
for exactly how long he will be liable to repay a specific type of debt. This 
prevents a situation where the payment of a debt is demanded from a debtor 
many years later, when the liability for the debt arose so long ago that there 
is little to no evidence available to prove or disprove the existence of the 
debt.4 It also encourages creditors to generally exercise their rights, 
specifically to collect their debts timeously and without unnecessary delay.5 
                                            
 Michelle Kelly-Louw. BIuris LLB LLM LLD (Unisa), Dip Insolvency Law and Practice 
(UJ). Professor in the Department of Mercantile Law, UNISA. E-mail: 
kellym@unisa.ac.za.This article is based on a paper entitled "Proposed Draft 
Prescription Bill and Its Impact on the Credit Industry" delivered by Michelle Kelly-
Louw at the 2018 Credit and Decision Analytics Conference held in Fancourt, 
George, South Africa on 6 September 2018. We also gratefully acknowledge the 
financial assistance of the National Research Foundation. 
  Philip N Stoop. BCom LLB LLM (Pret) LLD (Unisa). Professor, Department of 
Mercantile Law, UNISA. E-mail: stooppn@unisa.ac.za. 
1  See Loubser 1988 SALJ 51-52. 
2  For a general discussion of what the justifications of extinctive prescription are, see 
Loubser 1988 SALJ; Loubser Extinctive Prescription 22-24; Saner Prescription in 
South African Law para 1.2; Loubser 2016 Stell LR 374-376 where he refers to De 
Wet Regsgeleerde Lesings 135-144; Loubser "JC de Wet and the Theory of 
Extinctive Prescription" 397-398; and Food and Allied Workers' Union obo 
Gaoshubelwe v Pieman's Pantry (Pty) Limited 2018 5 BCLR 527 (CC) paras [50], 
[143]-[148]. 
3  See SALRC Harmonisation of Existing Laws 10; Saner Prescription in South African 
Law para 1.2 at 1-4; and Loubser 2016 Stell LR 374-376. 
4  Also see Murray & Roberts Construction (Cape) (Pty) Ltd v Upington Municipality 
1984 1 SA 571 (A) 578F-H; and KLD Residential CC v Empire Earth Investments 17 
(Pty) Ltd 2017 3 All SA 739 (SCA) para 13. 
5  See SALRC Harmonisation of Existing Laws 10; and Saner Prescription in South 
African Law para 1.2 at 1-4; and Road Accident Fund v Mdeyide 2011 2 SA 26 (CC) 
para 2. 
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Prescription is aimed "at enhancing judicial economy and efficiency in the 
administration of justice" which is best achieved when parties are forced to 
have "their disputes adjudicated upon promptly, while evidence is available 
and the memory of the witnesses is still fresh."6 
The prescription of debts arising from consumer-credit agreements is 
regulated by the Prescription Act, which since it commenced on 1 December 
1970 has not been extensively amended (the last amendment to the Act 
being made in 2015).7 Any issue of prescription not specifically regulated by 
the Prescription Act or another piece of legislation (for example, the 
Institution of Legal Proceedings against Certain Organs of State Act 40 of 
20028 and the Magistrates' Court Act 32 of 1944) is likely to be regulated by 
the common law.9 The prescription of debt that arises from a credit 
agreement governed by the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (NCA) is jointly 
governed by the NCA and the Prescription Act 68 of 1969 (the Prescription 
Act). Before the introduction of section 126B of the NCA by the National 
Credit Amendment Act 19 of 2014, the NCA contained no provisions dealing 
specifically with the prescription of a debt arising from a credit agreement 
governed by the NCA.10 The Prescription Act regulates the exact 
prescription periods, interruptions, delays and general aspects of 
prescription, while the NCA regulates and prohibits the behaviour of credit 
providers regarding the selling, collecting and reactivation of prescribed 
debt. There is some overlap between these two pieces of legislation as they 
relate to debt resulting from credit agreements falling within the scope of the 
NCA. 
In general, if a debtor in an applicable time period makes no payment 
towards settling a debt, does not acknowledge owing the debt or agree to 
pay it; or if the creditor does not demand payment from a debtor, start legal 
action against him or communicate with him in any manner and within the 
applicable time period, a debt becomes prescribed. This entails in essence 
that the debt (including a subsidiary debt which arose from such a principal 
                                            
6  SALRC Harmonisation of Existing Laws 10; also see Loubser Extinctive Prescription 
23; and Loubser 2016 Stell LR 374-376.  
7  In 1960 JC de Wet had been tasked by the Law Reform Commission to draft a 
memorandum for the reform of the Prescription Act 18 of 1943. The memorandum 
contained draft legislation which was eventually adopted with minor changes as the 
Prescription Act 68 of 1969. See Loubser "JC de Wet and the Theory of Extinctive 
Prescription" 397-398. 
8  See, eg, Minister of Police v Yekiso 2019 2 SA 281 (WCC) in which the Prescription 
Act and the Institution of Legal Proceedings against certain Organs of State Act both 
applied.  
9  See Saner Prescription in South African Law para 1.4; and Christie and Bradfield 
Christie's Law of Contract 501. For a discussion of the common law see Saner 
"Prescription" para 104. 
10  See Van Heerden "Enforcement of Credit Agreements" (2016) para 12.17.2. 
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debt, such as interest or a surety)11 is extinguished and the creditor forever 
loses its right to claim payment based on the debt.12 Over the years the 
selling, collecting and reactivation of prescribed debts became a massive 
source of revenue for the debt-collection industry, "much of [the debt] having 
been written off by credit providers and sold to collectors for a few cents in 
the rand."13 Credit providers14 (as the NCA refers to a creditor as a "credit 
provider", this is the term that will be used hereafter) would sell their 
prescribed debts to debt collectors, who would then contact consumers (as 
the NCA refers to a debtor as a "consumer",15 this is the term that will be 
used hereafter) demanding the payment of these debts. Not being aware of 
their rights, consumers often made payments on these prescribed debts and 
in doing so unknowingly "re-activated" them.16 Debt collectors often inflated 
prescribed debts with more interest and costs and attempted to collect these 
from consumers for their own account.17 Although the Prescription Act's 
objective is to give consumers some protection against collectors harassing 
them to pay on stale and inflated prescribed debts, it does not prohibit debt 
collectors from attempting to do so.18 
The Prescription Act requires the consumer to be aware of prescription and 
to specifically raise it as a defence when faced with a demand for payment 
in order to reap the benefits of it.19 Not being aware of their rights in this 
regard, consumers in practice often failed to raise the defence of 
prescription, resulting in their paying on the prescribed debts and/or signing 
acknowledgments of debt (liability) for the prescribed debts and thereby 
                                            
11  Section 10(2) of the Prescription Act; Saner Prescription in South African Law para 
3.3.1 at 3-36; and Jans v Nedcor Bank Ltd 2003 6 SA 646 (SCA). 
12  Bradfield Christie's Law of Contract 560; Muswere 2016 
https://www.fin24.com/Debt/News/everything-you-need-to-know-about-prescribed-
debt-20160619. 
13  See Knowler 2018 https://www.businesslive.co.za/bt/money/2018-02-24-
prescribed-debt-a-confusing-and-contentious-issue/. 
14  See the definition of "credit provider" in s 1 of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 
(NCA). 
15  See the definition of "consumer" in s 1 of the NCA. 
16  See the discussion of s 10(3) of the Prescription Act in para 2 below. It should be 
noted that "reactivation of prescribed debt" is not synonomous with "reactivation of 
debt" by paying the arrears under the NCA. See Nkata v FirstRand Bank Limited 
2016 4 SA 257 (CC), where the latter is discussed.  
17  See Knowler 2018 https://www.businesslive.co.za/bt/money/2018-02-24-
prescribed-debt-a-confusing-and-contentious-issue/. 
18  See Knowler 2018 https://www.businesslive.co.za/bt/money/2018-02-24-
prescribed-debt-a-confusing-and-contentious-issue/. 
19  Section 17 of the Presription Act; also see Knowler 2018 
https://www.businesslive.co.za/bt/money/2018-02-24-prescribed-debt-a-confusing-
and-contentious-issue/. 
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"reactivating" them.20 As this practice was not outlawed, the debt-collecting 
industry continued to collect on prescribed debt. This abusive practice 
prompted the Legislature to make amendments to the NCA in 201521 by 
including section 126B in the NCA, which now prohibits any credit provider 
or debt collector from selling, continuing to collect payment on or 
reactivating a prescribed debt under a credit agreement governed by the 
NCA. Section 126B of the NCA also amended and expanded the operation 
of the prescription defence for consumers relating to debt arising from credit 
agreements governed by the NCA. It appears that nowhere else in the world 
does a provision in credit law exist similar to section 126B of the NCA.22 
It has already been indicated above that the prescription of debt that arises 
from a credit agreement governed by the NCA is jointly governed by the 
NCA and the Prescription Act. The Prescription Act generally regulates all 
aspects of the prescription of debts (which would also include the 
prescription of consumer debts under the NCA), while section 126B of the 
NCA regulates and prohibits certain practices related to the prescription of 
consumer debts, such as the selling of prescribed consumer debts or the 
continued collection or re-activation of prescribed consumer debts. In this 
article section 126B is specifically analysed, and the question whether 
section 126B absolutely prohibits certain abusive practices related to the 
prescription of consumer debts is answered. However, before we analyse 
section 126B of the NCA, specific practical issues are addressed to provide 
a better understanding of the impact of the NCA on the prescription of 
debts.23 These issues include what the position will be if a consumer (under 
the NCA) is outside South Africa, what the position will be if a consumer's 
address (under the NCA) has changed or will change, and what the impact 
of non-compliance with section 96 (on the change of a consumer's address) 
of the NCA will be on prescription if the consumer fails to notify the credit 
provider of his change of address and section 129(1)(a) notice and 
summons consequently never comes to the attention of the consumer. In 
this article we also point out several shortcomings of the current legislation. 
Some aspects of the draft Prescription Bill proposed by the South African 
Law Reform Commission are also considered. In particular, we focus on the 
impact the Bill may have on the consumer-credit industry. We consider only 
the prescription of debt arising from credit agreements governed by the 
NCA, the changes brought about to the prescription of debt by section 126B 
                                            
20  See para 2 below where the reactivation of debt is discussed. 
21  See the National Credit Amendment Act 19 of 2014. 
22  Otto 2015 TSAR 756.  
23  See para 3 below.  
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of the NCA, and how prescription impacts generally on debts in the 
consumer-credit industry.24 We also consider relevant aspects of the 
proposed draft Prescription Bill recently issued by the South African Law 
Reform Commission25 and highlight a few of the major proposed changes 
likely to have an impact on the consumer-credit industry. 
2  Prescription of debts 
Before we discuss the impact of the NCA on prescription it is important first 
to consider general aspects of prescription law such as when a debt 
becomes prescribed. 
When a debt becomes prescribed depends on the following four 
questions:26 
 What type of debt it is? The type of debt determines the applicable 
prescription period, resulting in the second question. 
 What is the applicable prescription period that is involved? 
 When did the prescription period begin to run? 
 Was the prescription delayed or interrupted? 
The time period after which a specific type of debt prescribes is set out in 
section 11 of the Prescription Act read with section 10(1). The important 
periods for credit providers in the consumer-credit industry to observe are:27 
 three years for ordinary debt, for instance, unsecured credit;28 
                                            
24  This article is not meant to be a complete discussion of the law of prescription, but 
merely focusses on the prescription of debts under the NCA.  
25  See SALRC Harmonisation of Existing Laws. 
26  See Jansen van Rensburg 2015 https://www.schoemanlaw.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/prescription-on-template.pdf; also see Loubser "JC de Wet 
and the Theory of Extinctive Prescription" 400-417. 
27  Also see Harms Procedural Timetables 195-198; Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 
v Miracle Mile Investments 67 (Pty) Ltd 2017 1 SA 185 (SCA) para [4]; and BKB 
Limited v Bezuidenhout 2019 ZAECGHC 18 (5 March 2019) para [18]. 
28  Section 11(d) of the Prescription Act. 
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 30 years for debt related to a mortgage bond29 (a special notarial bond 
in terms of the Security by Means of Movable Property Act 57 of 1993 
is included in the term "mortgage");30  
 six years for a debt arising from a bill of exchange or other negotiable 
instrument or a notarial contact,31 unless a longer period applies in 
respect of the debt in question in terms of section 11(a) or (b); and 
 30 years for debt where a credit provider obtained a judgment against 
the consumer for the debt.32 When a credit provider has obtained a 
judgment for unsecured credit the debt thereon will not be prescribed 
in three years as is the normal period for unsecured credit, but the 
period will be 30 years because a judgment was obtained against the 
consumer for that specific debt.33 
When the prescription of a debt begins to run is regulated by section 12 of 
the Prescription Act.34 Generally, prescription commences only once "the 
debt is due",35 in other words, when it is recoverable or enforceable.36 
However, if the consumer willfully prevents the credit provider from coming 
to know of the existence of the debt, prescription does not begin to run until 
the credit provider becomes aware of the existence of the debt.37 
Furthermore, a debt is not deemed to be due until the credit provider has 
knowledge of the identity of the consumer and of the facts from which the 
                                            
29  Section 11(a)(i) of the Prescription Act. 
30  See Factaprops 1052 CC v The Land and Agricultural Development Bank of South 
Africa 2017 4 SA 495 (SCA). However, see Sonnekus 2017 TSAR 597-609, where 
he criticises the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Factsprops and other 
cases. For a full discussion of the prescription period for a debt secured by a 
mortgage bond, see Saner Prescription in South African Law para 3.3.2(a)(i) 3-36–
3-39. 
31  Section 11(c) of the Prescription Act. 
32  Section 11(a)(ii) of the Prescription Act. For a full discussion, see Saner Prescription 
in South African Law para 3.3.2(a)(ii) at 3-39–3-40. 
33  See Jansen van Rensburg 2015 https://www.schoemanlaw.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/prescription-on-template.pdf. 
34  Also see Food and Allied Workers' Union obo Gaoshubelwe v Pieman's Pantry (Pty) 
Limited 2018 5 BCLR 527 (CC) para [210], where the court points out that s 12 
provides considerable flexibility and protection to a creditor. 
35  Section 12(1) of the Prescription Act. 
36  As there is no definition given in the Act of when a debt is "due", the term must be 
given its ordinary and general meaning. For a detailed discussion of this and s 12, 
as a whole, see Saner Prescription in South African Law para 3.3.3 at 3-66–3-140 
and the authorities cited there; and for when the debt under a loan agreement 
containing an acceleration clause becomes enforceable and prescription accordingly 
begins to run, see Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Miracle Mile Investments 67 
(Pty) Ltd 2017 1 SA 185 (SCA). 
37  Section 12(2) of the Prescription Act. 
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debt arises; and provided that the credit provider is deemed to have such 
knowledge if he could have obtained it by exercising reasonable care.38 
There are instances, however, where the running of prescription will be 
delayed or interrupted, and the Prescription Act deals with these 
circumstances.39 The intention is not to fully discuss these instances here, 
but to merely highlight those relevant for the purposes of our article. Some 
of the circumstances where prescription will either be delayed or interrupted 
include where: 
 the consumer has expressly or tacitly acknowledged the liability40 and 
not just his indebtedness (as the term "acknowledgement of liability" is 
not defined, it must be given its ordinary meaning and common law 
and case law must be used to interpret its precise meaning);41 once 
the liability (that is, indebtedness)42 is acknowledged, prescription will 
run afresh from the day of the acknowledgment or from the new date 
that has been agreed between the parties as constituting the new due 
date for the debt;43 
 the consumer has made payment on the debt;44 
 the credit provider has taken legal action (called judicial interruption) 
against the consumer (that is, the service on the consumer of any 
process - for instance, notice of motion, a rule nisi, a pleading in 
reconvention and any other document whereby legal proceedings are 
commenced) whereby the credit provider has claimed payment on the 
debt;45 and it is important to note here that it is the serving of a 
summons (for example) on the consumer and not merely the issuing 
of a summons or the serving of a default notice in terms of section 129 
of the NCA that interrupts the running of prescription;46 and in order to 
                                            
38  Section 12(3) of the Prescription Act; and see Motokonya v Minister of Police 2018 
5 SA 22 (CC). 
39  Sections 13-15 of the Prescription Act; and for a detailed discussion, see Saner 
Prescription in South African Law paras 3.3.4–3.3.6. 
40  Section 14(1) of the Prescription Act. 
41  See Saner Prescription in South African Law para 3.3.6; Benson v Walters 1984 1 
SA 73 (A) 86H and the other authorities cited. 
42  Benson v Walters 1984 1 SA 73 (A) 86H. 
43  Section 14(2) of the Prescription Act. 
44  Section 10(3) read with s 14(1) of the Prescription Act. 
45  Section 15 of the Prescription Act. 
46  See Arendsnes Sweefspoor CC v Botha 2013 5 SA 399 (SCA); Investec Bank Ltd v 
Ramurunzi 2014 4 SA 394 (SCA) paras 21-26; Koekemoer and Pretorius 2014 Ann 
Surv SA L 1053-1055; and also see Food and Allied Workers' Union obo 
Gaoshubelwe v Pieman's Pantry (Pty) Limited 2018 5 BCLR 527 (CC) paras [195]-
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benefit the credit provider must successfully prosecute his claim under 
the process to final judgment, unless the debtor acknowledges 
liability,47 the credit provider abandons his judgment or the judgment 
is set aside;48 
 the consumer is resident outside South Africa;49 
 the consumer is married to or is a business partner of the credit 
provider;50 
 the credit provider is a minor, insane, or under curatorship, or is 
prevented by superior force, including any law or any order of court, 
from interrupting the running of prescription as contemplated in section 
15(1);51  
 the debt is the object of a dispute in arbitration;52  
 the debt is the object of a claim filed against the estate of a consumer 
who is deceased or against the insolvent estate of the consumer;53 or 
 the creditor or the consumer is deceased and an executor of the 
relevant estate has not yet been appointed.54 
Section 13(2) of the Prescription Act provides that a debt that arises from a 
contract and that would, but for the provisions of section 13(1), become 
prescribed before a reciprocal debt that arises from the same contract 
becomes prescribed, does not become prescribed before the reciprocal 
debt becomes prescribed. 
                                            
[204], where the Constitutional Court held that whilst most of the documents to which 
reference is made in s 15(6) ordinarily constitute documents associated with courts 
and the litigation advanced there, the reference made in s 15(6) to "any document 
whereby legal proceedings are commenced" viewed through the prism of s 39(2) of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, is indicative of a broader and 
more generous approach to what may constitute such a document. 
47  Section15(2) of the Prescription Act. 
48  Section 15 read with s 13(1)(a) of the Prescription Act; see Sentrachem Limited v 
Terreblanche 2017 ZASCA 16 (22 March 2017); Silhouette Investments Ltd v Virgin 
Hotels Group Ltd 2009 4 SA 617 (SCA); and for a full discussion of judicial 
interruption of prescription, see Saner Prescription in South African Law paras 3.3.8 
and 3.3.11. 
49  See s 13(1)(b) of the Prescription Act. 
50  Section 13(1)(c) and (d) of the Prescription Act. 
51  Section 13(1)(a) of the Prescription Act. 
52  Section 13(1)(g) of the Prescription Act. 
53  Section 13(1)(g) of the Prescription Act. 
54  Section 13(1)(h) of the Prescription Act. 
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To establish whether there has been an acknowledgement of liability such 
as to effect an interruption of prescription, the enquiry will inevitability always 
be a factual one with regard to the intention of the debtor.55 Such an 
intention will be manifested tacitly by the words and actions of the consumer 
in the specific circumstances of the case.56 For instance, where a consumer 
makes a payment on a debt, such a payment is generally considered to 
constitute the consumer's tacit acknowledgement of the liability (the 
indebtedness) that could interrupt the running of prescription.57 Of course, 
a tacit or express acknowledgment of liability by the consumer after the debt 
has already prescribed cannot operate to interrupt the prescription of such 
a debt. Section 14(1) makes it evident that the section deals with the 
interruption of a period that is still "running". Therefore, if the prescription 
period has been completed there can be no application of section 14, as 
there is no running prescription to be interrupted.58 
Section 10(3) of the Prescription Act stipulates that the payment by the 
consumer of a debt (including a subsidiary debt which arose from such a 
principal debt, such as suretyship or interest)59 after it has been 
extinguished by prescription is regarded as payment. Section 10(3) is aimed 
to protect someone who has received the payment of a debt (for instance, 
a credit provider) that has prescribed prior to the payment by the lapse of 
the specific time period in the Act.60 In essence, this means that the payment 
made to the credit provider on a prescribed debt cannot be claimed back.61 
It has been argued that prescription under the Prescription Act confers a 
defence on the debtor in the form of a substantive right to refuse 
performance while the prescribed obligation remains intact and can still be 
complied with. In other words, although section 10(1) of the Prescription Act 
provides that a debt is extinguished by prescription after the lapse of the 
prescription period, there are specific qualifications.62 One qualification that 
is provided for in section 10(3) provides that the payment by the debtor of a 
prescribed debt is regarded as the payment of a debt. In addition, 
                                            
55  Saner Prescription in South African Law 3-177. 
56  Saner Prescription in South African Law 3-177–3-180 and the authorities cited; and 
Agnew v Union and South West Africa Insurance Co Ltd 1977 1 SA 617 (A) 623A-
C. 
57  See s 10(3) read with s 14(1) of the Prescription Act. 
58  Saner Prescription in South African Law 3-183. 
59  See s 10(2) of the Prescription Act and Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Oneanate 
Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 4 SA 510 (C) 557D-558A. 
60  Saner Prescription in South African Law para 3.3.1 at 3-35; and Kuhne & Nagel AG 
Zurich v APA Distributors (Pty) Ltd 1981 3 SA 536 (W) 538G-H. 
61  Saner Prescription in South African Law para 3.3.1 at 3-35. 
62  Loubser "JC de Wet and the Theory of Extinctive Prescription" 408-411. 
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prescription does not take effect by operation of law, but only if raised in 
pleadings.63 These qualifications to extinguishment by prescription under 
section 10(1) mean that after the prescription period has elapsed, the debt 
retains all the characteristics of a subsisting debt, but the debtor acquires a 
substantive right or defence which will, if invoked, render him exempt from 
performance.64 Therefore, if prescription is not invoked in terms of section 
17 and performance is still rendered, it will be regarded as due performance 
in terms of section 10(3).65 Therefore, when a payment is made on a 
prescribed debt, the payment is regarded as due performance. Alternatively, 
where the consumer is unaware of the fact that the debt has prescribed and 
enters into an acknowledgment of debt (a new agreement), the consumer 
effectively re-activates the debt.66 Although these statements hold true for 
consumers of debt in general, the situation is somewhat different when it 
involves consumers where the debt resulted from a credit agreement 
governed by the NCA. The law concerning the prescription of debt governed 
by the NCA was changed in this regard when section 126B was inserted 
into the NCA and came into force on 13 March 2015.67 
3  The influence of the NCA on prescription: practical 
aspects 
It has already been indicated above that the prescription of debt that arises 
from a credit agreement governed by the NCA is jointly governed by the 
NCA and the Prescription Act.68 The introduction of section 126B of the NCA 
has an impact on the selling and collecting of prescribed debts under credit 
agreements regulated in terms of the NCA. However, before we consider 
                                            
63  Section 17 of the Prescription Act; Loubser "JC de Wet and the Theory of Extinctive 
Prescription" 408-409. 
64  Loubser "JC de Wet and the Theory of Extinctive Prescription" 409. 
65  See, however, Loubser "JC de Wet and the Theory of Extinctive Prescription" 409-
410, where he states that if after the prescription period has elapsed the debtor 
expressly or tacitly acknowledges liability, prescription is not interrupted in terms of 
s 14(1) because the debt has been extinguished and can therefore not be interrupted 
or extended by agreement. 
66  In this regard one should keep the distinction between the "strong" and "weak" 
effects of prescription in mind. In terms of "strong" prescription, a debt no longer 
exists once the prescription period has lapsed, and in terms of "weak prescription" 
the debtor is granted a right to refuse performance, but if he pays, payment is 
regarded as valid payment. Also see Loubser "JC de Wet and the Theory of 
Extinctive Prescription" 410-411. 
67  See Proc R10 in GG 38557 of 13 March 2015. 
68  See ss 2(7) and 4(7) of the Prescription Act for what the position will be if there is an 
inconsistency between a provision of this NCA and another Act (the Prescription Act 
in this case). 
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section 126B of the NCA in paragraph 4 below, it is essential first to address 
a few practical issues.  
3.1 The position when a consumer is outside of South Africa 
The first issue is what the position will be if a consumer is outside South 
Africa. In terms of section 13(1)(b) of the Prescription Act, the prescription 
of a debt is delayed if the debtor is outside South Africa.  
3.2 The position when a consumer's address has changed or will 
change 
A second issue is what the position will be if a consumer's address has 
changed or will change. Section 96(1) of the NCA requires notices to be 
delivered at the address provided by the recipient of the notices (the 
consumer, for purposes of this article).69 Furthermore, section 96(2) of the 
NCA provides that a party to a credit agreement (the consumer for the 
purposes of this article) should inform the other party (the credit provider) of 
any change of address by notifying the other person (the credit provider) via 
registered mail or electronic mail of the new address.70 Van Heerden is of 
the opinion that when a change of address is not effected in accordance 
with section 96(2) of the NCA, the notice of the change of address is not 
valid for the purposes of the NCA.71  
3.3 The effect of a consumer's failure to notify a credit provider of his 
change of address  
In Balkind v Absa Bank Ltd72 the consumer failed to notify the credit provider 
of his change of address, and the section 129(1)(a) notice and summons 
consequently never came to the attention of the consumer. The court held, 
however, that in the absence of any indication that the debtor deliberately 
avoided receipt of the credit provider's notice, the judgment was rescinded, 
although the notice was dispatched to the consumer's chosen address.73 In 
Robertson v Firstrand Bank t/a Wesbank74 the consumer also failed to notify 
the credit provider of his change of address, so the court allowed the credit 
                                            
69  See Van Heerden "Enforcement of Credit Agreements" (2018) paras 12.4.4 and 
12.4.5. 
70  See Van Heerden "Enforcement of Credit Agreements" (2018) paras 12.4.5 and 
12.4.6. 
71  Van Heerden "Enforcement of Credit Agreements" (2016) para 12.4.6. Also see 
Kubyana v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 2014 3 SA 56 (CC) paras [28]-[30] and [48]. 
72  Balkind v Absa Bank Ltd 2013 2 SA 486 (ECG). 
73  Balkind v Absa Bank Ltd 2013 2 SA 486 (ECG) para [64]. 
74  Robertson v Firstrand Bank t/a Wesbank 2015 ZAECGHC 7 (24 February 2015). 
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provider to use the consumer's address initially chosen in the agreement for 
the delivery of notices and summons.75 Van Heerden is of the opinion that 
the position in Robertson is correct: if a consumer fails to notify a credit 
provider of his change of address as required by the NCA, the credit 
provider is entitled to use the consumer's domicilium address as chosen in 
the credit agreement.76 It is therefore submitted that if a consumer 
deliberately fails to notify a credit provider of his change of address in 
accordance with section 96 of the NCA, and the credit provider therefore 
fails to bring a section 129(1)(a) notice to the attention of the consumer, the 
consumer's failure to inform the credit provider of his change of address 
may operate as a form of estoppel to prevent the consumer from raising a 
defence based on prescription, because bringing the section 129(1)(a) 
notice to the consumer's attention is one of the prerequisites for instituting 
legal proceedings against the consumer under the NCA.77 It is also 
submitted that it makes no sense to prevent a credit provider from instituting 
legal proceedings due to his non-compliance with section 129(1)(a) if his 
non-compliance stems from the non-compliance of the consumer with the 
requirement that he inform the credit provider of his change of address in 
accordance with section 96 of the NCA – mere delivery of a section 
129(1)(a) notice to the consumer's domicilium address as chosen in the 
credit agreement should then be regarded as full compliance (also see 
paragraph 3.4 for a detailed discussion of the impact of non-compliance with 
section 129(1)(a)). 
So what will the impact of non-compliance with section 96 of the NCA be on 
prescription? It has been indicated that the credit provider should not be 
prevented from instituting legal proceedings against a consumer who 
intentionally fails to inform the credit provider of his change of address to 
evade the service of a section 129(1)(a) notice in order to frustrate the 
enforcement of a valid claim against him – and likewise, he should not be 
able to raise prescription in these circumstances. Again, it would simply be 
wrong to penalise a credit provider with prescription where a consumer 
deliberately makes it impossible for the credit provider to contact him to 
claim or demand payment of an outstanding debt, for instance, by changing 
his contact details and/or address without notifying the credit provider. In 
                                            
75  Robertson v Firstrand Bank t/a Wesbank 2015 ZAECGHC 7 (24 February 2015) 
paras [32]-[36]. Also see Van Heerden "Enforcement of Credit Agreements" (2016) 
para 12.4.6. 
76  Van Heerden "Enforcement of Credit Agreements" (2018) para 12.4.6. 
77  Also see Balkind v Absa Bank Ltd 2013 2 SA 486 (ECG) [para [64], where the court 
considered estoppel as a defence which prevented the consumer from raising a 
defence based on the non-receipt of a s 129(1)(a) of the NCA notice, where the 
consumer failed to notify the credit provider of his change of address.  
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other words, it makes no sense to penalise a credit provider for non-
compliance, if the non-compliance is caused by the consumer's failure to 
comply with section 96 of the NCA. That brings us back to the main issue, 
namely what the effect of non-compliance with section 129(1)(a) will be on 
prescription.78 
3.4 The impact of resultant non-compliance with section 129(1)(a) on 
prescription 
In Investec Bank Limited t/a Investec Private Bank v Ramurunzi79 the 
Supreme Court of Appeal had to decide whether a summons was defective 
because it was not preceded by the delivery of a section 129 notice to the 
consumer, or put differently, whether a summons served before the notice 
in terms of section 129 had been delivered to the consumer interrupted the 
running of prescription.80 The NCA is silent regarding the effect of non-
compliance with section 129 on prescription. Section 130(4)(b), an unusual 
provision, requires a court to adjourn proceedings so that a credit provider 
can rectify his failure to comply with the relevant provisions of the NCA 
before the matter can be resumed. If a consumer has not received a section 
129 notice, a court should therefore adjourn proceedings so that a credit 
provider can give notice as required. The SCA held that a credit provider 
then gives a consumer the benefit of notice of his options (which is ordinarily 
given before a summons is issued and served). In this light, the proceedings 
are therefore not void in the absence of a section 129 notice.81 The court 
also held that the aim of section 130(4)(b) is to ensure that although 
summons has been served, the consumer is still furnished with a section 
129 notice, so that he knows the available options before the debt is 
enforced.82 The court further held that this is in line with the common law 
related to prescription: a summons and the particulars of a claim can be 
cured, where defective, after the period of prescription has run out.83 The 
                                            
78  The effect of non-compliance with s 129(1)(a) on prescription is discussed in detail 
in Van Heerden and Boraine 2015 THRHR 457-475. See specifically at 470-472 the 
discussion of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Investec Bank Ltd v 
Ramurunzi 2014 4 SA 394 (SCA). Also see Van Heerden "Enforcement of Credit 
Agreements" (2018) para 12.17.2. 
79  Investec Bank Ltd v Ramurunzi 2014 4 SA 394 (SCA). 
80  Investec Bank Ltd v Ramurunzi 2014 4 SA 394 (SCA) para [2]. 
81  Investec Bank Ltd v Ramurunzi 2014 4 SA 394 (SCA) para [23]. The SCA based this 
decision on Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) para 
52-53, where Cameron J held that "[t]he proceedings have life, but a court must 
'adjourn' the matter, and make an appropriate order requiring the credit provider to 
complete specified steps before resuming the matter. The absence of notice leads 
to a pause, not to nullity." 
82  Investec Bank Ltd v Ramurunzi 2014 4 SA 394 (SCA) para [24]. 
83  Investec Bank Ltd v Ramurunzi 2014 4 SA 394 (SCA) para [24].  
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court then also held that "[e]ven an excipiable summons, or one that is 
amended so as to introduce a new cause of action (where substantially the 
same debt is being claimed) has the effect of interrupting prescription."84 
However, the court held that a section 129 notice would not itself interrupt 
prescription if delivered before summons was served.85 Van Heerden and 
Boraine therefore submit that a section 129 notice in fact plays a limited role 
in the context of prescription, but it remains very important, because without 
the notice a credit provider will not be able to proceed with enforcement after 
summons has been issued (section 15(2) of the Prescription Act requires 
finality) and non-compliance may be regarded as an abuse of the court that 
warrants dismissal of the action.86 
According to Van Heerden and Boraine there may also be further scenarios, 
each with its own consequences:87 
a) A section 129(1)(a) notice has been issued but the credit provider 
fails to issue and serve summons, therefore the debt will be 
prescribed, for instance within three years, because the notice does 
not interrupt the running of prescription. 
b) A section 129(1)(a) notice has been issued and summons has been 
issued and served, for instance within three years, but the credit 
provider fails to allege compliance with section 129(1)(a): the 
summons can be amended in terms of section 130(4)(b)(ii) to reflect 
compliance with section 129(1)(a). 
c) No section 129(1)(a) notice has been delivered by the credit provider 
and no summons has been served: the debt will be prescribed, for 
instance within three years from the time the debt became due. 
d) No section 129(1)(a) notice has been delivered before summons has 
been issued and served, but summons has been issued and served 
before the debt prescribes: based on section 130(4)(b) the summons 
interrupts prescription and despite the non-compliance with section 
129(1)(a) the summons will not be void and a court has to adjourn 
the matter and make an appropriate determination setting out steps 
                                            
84  Investec Bank Ltd v Ramurunzi 2014 4 SA 394 (SCA) para [24].  
85  Investec Bank Ltd v Ramurunzi 2014 4 SA 394 (SCA) para [24].  
86  Van Heerden and Boraine 2015 THRHR 473-474. Also see Van Heerden 
"Enforcement of Credit Agreements" (2018) para 12.17.2. 
87  Van Heerden and Boraine 2015 THRHR 473-474. Also see Van Heerden 
"Enforcement of Credit Agreements" (2018) para 12.17.2. 
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the credit provider has to complete before the matter may be 
resumed.  
e) Prior to the prescription of the debt no section 129(1)(a) notice has 
been delivered before or after summons has been served, so the 
consumer never gets an opportunity to receive and respond to the 
notice: in the light of section 15(2) of the Prescription Act the credit 
provider is then not successfully prosecuting his claim to final 
judgment and the interruption of prescription will therefore be 
undone. Alternatively, compliance with section 129(1)(a) after an 
unreasonable period of inaction since the service of summons may 
lead to the claim’s being dismissed due to the abuse of a court 
process.88 
It is submitted that the following related scenario may also exist: 
f) A debt prescribes because summons has not been issued and 
served as a result of non-compliance with section 129(1)(a), where a 
consumer deliberately escapes the enforcement of a debt by not 
giving notice of a change of address in terms of section 96: the 
consumer's failure to inform the credit provider of his change of 
address may operate as a form of estoppel to prevent the consumer 
from raising a defence based on prescription when the debt is 
eventually enforced. 
More scenarios may exist where a consumer deliberately fails to give notice 
of a change of address in terms of section 96 and it remains to be seen how 
courts will deal with it. One should in this event rely on Robertson: if a 
consumer fails to notify a credit provider of his change of address as 
required by the NCA, the credit provider is entitled to use the consumer's 
domicilium address as chosen in the credit agreement. Alternatively, it is 
submitted that in the light of the discussions in this paragraph a credit 
provider should not be prevented from instituting legal proceedings or 
enforcing a debt against a debtor who intentionally fails to inform the credit 
provider of his change of address to evade the service of a section 129(1)(a) 
notice in order to frustrate the enforcement of a valid claim against him – 
and likewise, he should not be able to raise prescription in these 
circumstances. 
                                            
88  Van Heerden "Enforcement of Credit Agreements" (2018) para 12.17.2. 
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3.5 The commencement of prescription where a credit agreement 
contains an acceleration clause 
Another issue connected to the prescription of consumer debt relates to the 
commencement of prescription where a credit agreement contains an 
acceleration clause that entitles the credit provider to claim the whole 
outstanding amount. The court dealt with this issue in Standard Bank of 
South Africa Ltd v Miracle Mile Investments 67 (Pty) Ltd.89 In this case the 
court had to decide whether the debt was due under section 12(1) of the 
Prescription Act when the principal debtor breached its obligation or when 
the creditor elected to enforce an acceleration clause to render the whole 
outstanding amount payable.90 The court held that where an acceleration 
clause gives the creditor the right of election to enforce the clause upon 
default by the debtor, the debt in terms of the acceleration clause becomes 
due in terms of section 12(1) of the Prescription Act only when the creditor 
has elected to enforce the clause. Before the election by the creditor, 
prescription does not begin to run.91 That is because the election to enforce 
the acceleration clause transforms the instalment debts into a single debt 
for the full outstanding amount.92 
It was indicated at the outset of this contribution93 that section 126B of the 
NCA brought about changes to the prescription of consumer debt and to 
how prescription impacts generally on debts in the consumer-credit industry. 
It is therefore also important to consider the impact of section 126B in the 
context of the prescription of consumer debt. The impact of section 126B of 
the NCA will therefore be considered in the following paragraph. 
4  Section 126B of the NCA and prescription 
Section 126B of the NCA provides: 
(1)(a)  No person may sell a debt under a credit agreement to which this Act 
applies and that has been extinguished by prescription under the 
Prescription Act, 1969 (Act 68 of 1969).  
                                            
89  Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Miracle Mile Investments 67 (Pty) Ltd 2017 1 
SA 185 (SCA). Also see a discussion of this case in Van Heerden "Enforcement of 
Credit Agreements" (2018) para 12.17.2. 
90  Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Miracle Mile Investments 67 (Pty) Ltd 2017 1 
SA 185 (SCA) para [2]. 
91  Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Miracle Mile Investments 67 (Pty) Ltd 2017 1 
SA 185 (SCA) para [15]. 
92  Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Miracle Mile Investments 67 (Pty) Ltd 2017 1 
SA 185 (SCA) para [15]. 
93  See para 1 above. 
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(b)  No person may continue the collection of, or re-activate a debt under a 
credit agreement to which this Act applies– 
(i) which debt has been extinguished by prescription under the 
Prescription Act, 1969 (Act 68 of 1969); and 
(ii) where the consumer raises the defence of prescription, or would 
reasonably have raised the defence of prescription had the 
consumer been aware of such a defence, in response to a 
demand, whether as part of legal proceedings or otherwise. 
[Emphasis added.] 
As said at the outset of this article, section 126B was introduced to curb the 
abusive practice that existed at the time, where credit providers and/or debt 
collectors were continuously selling or collecting prescribed debt and tricked 
consumers, who were unaware of the law regarding prescription, into 
making payments on their prescribed debts in order to reactivate these 
debts. One could also say that section 126B(1)(a) is aimed at cedents by 
prohibiting them from selling debts that have been extinguished by 
prescription under the Prescription Act, and section 126B(1)(b) is aimed at 
cessionaries by prohibiting them from collecting or reactivating prescribed 
debts.94 
Section 126B(1)(b) at first sight seems to make it impossible to collect or 
reactivate a prescribed debt that falls under the NCA. However, there are 
two qualifications to the prohibition in section 126B(1)(b): a person may not 
collect or reactivate a debt if the debt has prescribed in terms of the 
Prescription Act; and where the consumer in fact raises the defence of 
prescription or would reasonably have raised it had he been aware of the 
defence, in response to a demand or as part of legal proceedings. It is 
therefore submitted that the prohibition in section 126B(1)(b) does not 
contain absolute prohibition, but a qualified prohibition. If a consumer is, for 
example, made aware of the defence of prescription but deliberately fails to 
invoke prescription in terms of section 17 of the Prescription Act and 
continues to make voluntary payments, even if the debt has prescribed, the 
performance may still be regarded as due performance in terms of section 
10(3) of the Prescription Act. Section 126B(1) also does not prohibit a 
consumer from entering into an acknowledgment of debt.95 In terms of 
                                            
94  The transfer of a right by agreement is known as "cession". The person who transfers 
the right is called the "cedent", and the person to whom it is transferred, the 
"cessionary". Also see Otto 2015 TSAR 770. 
95  See, eg, the facts in Kaknis v Absa Bank Limited; Kaknis v Man Financial Services 
SA (Pty) Ltd 2017 4 SA 17 (SCA) (hereinafter Kaknis) para 5, where the consumer 
signed an acknowledgment of the debt after the debt had become prescribed. Also 
see Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Miracle Mile Investments 67 (Pty) Ltd 2017 
1 SA 185 (SCA) fn 3, where it is emphasised that s 14(1) of the Prescription Act 
provides that the running of prescription shall be interrupted by an express or tacit 
acknowledgement of liability by the debtor. S 14(2) provides that if prescription is 
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section 14(1) of the Prescription Act prescription is interrupted by an 
acknowledgment of liability by the debtor and section 14(2) provides that if 
prescription is interrupted by an acknowledgment of liability by the debtor, 
prescription commences to run afresh from the day of the interruption if the 
parties postpone the date upon which the debt again becomes due. 
Therefore, the prohibition in section 126B(1)(b) of the NCA to collect or 
reactivate prescription is not absolute:96 it does not prohibit the acceptance 
of payment by the debtor of a prescribed debt under section 10(3) of the 
Prescription Act, and if a consumer is aware of the defence of prescription 
but deliberately fails to invoke it under section 17 of the Prescription Act. 
Section 126B of the NCA also deals with the consumer's right to raise the 
defence of prescription and somewhat changes the consumer's right to 
raise this defence as governed by the Prescription Act. In terms of section 
17 of the Prescription Act, in order for a consumer to benefit from the 
defence of prescription, he must raise the defence of prescription in the 
relevant document filed of record in the proceedings.97 A court will not of its 
own motion take notice of prescription,98 but may allow the prescription to 
be raised at any stage of the proceedings.99 It is submitted that the second 
qualification under section 126B(1)(b)(ii) of the NCA extends the rule under 
section 17 of the Prescription Act to some extent: the prohibition of the 
collection of prescribed debt does not apply only when a defence of 
prescription has been invoked under section 17 of the Prescription Act but 
also when a consumer "would reasonably have raised the defence of 
prescription had the consumer been aware of such a defence" (own 
emphasis added). The meaning of the aforementioned phrase is still 
uncertain and it remains to be seen what impact it is going to have on 
section 17 of the Prescription Act. It is suspected, however, that the 
legislature intended to leave some leeway for a consumer who has failed to 
raise the defence of prescription – and a presiding officer then has a 
discretion to take notice of prescription. Any uncertainty will be removed by 
the draft Prescription Bill.100 The draft Prescription Bill will change the need 
to specifically raise the defence of prescription and provides in clause 13(4) 
for a court during judicial proceedings to consider if a debt has prescribed. 
                                            
interrupted in terms of subsection (1), prescription shall commence to run anew from 
the date on which the interruption takes place, or from any date thereafter the parties 
agree to postpone the due date to. 
96  Also see below in this paragraph the discussion of the minority judgment in Kaknis 
paras 19 and 20. 
97  Section 17(2) of the Prescription Act. 
98  Section 17(1) of the Prescription Act; and Saner Prescription in South African Law 
3-261. 
99  Section 17(2) of the Prescription Act. 
100  See the discussion in para 5 below. 
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It must be noted that nothing in the Prescription Act or in section 126B of 
the NCA prohibits a consumer from renouncing or waiving his right to rely 
on prescription expressly or tacitly, provided he was not misled into doing 
so.101 It is generally acceptable for a consumer to expressly or even tacitly 
renounce or waive his right to rely on prescription in an acknowledgment of 
liability for a debt that has already prescribed. The situation is less clear and 
seems unacceptable where the consumer renounces or waives his right to 
rely on prescription before the debt has prescribed.102 However, a 
renouncement or waiver of the consumer's right to rely on prescription still 
has to pass the hurdles set by section 90 of the NCA, that regulates unlawful 
provisions in credit agreements. It may be the case that a renunciation or 
waiver of the consumer's right to rely on prescription may be unlawful 
because the purpose or effect of it is to defeat the purposes of the NCA or 
to deceive the consumer.103 
Section 126B(1)(b) seemingly permits a consumer to raise the defence of 
prescription at any stage, even in an instance where the consumer 
previously agreed, for example, to reactivate the prescribed debt by making 
a payment on the prescribed debt, but was unaware of the availability of the 
prescription defence when he did so.104 
In Kaknis v Absa Bank Limited; Kaknis v Man Financial Services SA (Pty) 
Ltd,105 the Supreme Court of Appeal considered whether section 126B of 
the NCA applied retrospectively. The consumer in this case had concluded 
various instalment agreements during 2006 to 2008 involving motor 
vehicles, trucks, trailers, quad bikes and a jet ski with two different credit 
providers. The consumer later defaulted on the repayments. He applied for 
debt review and was successful in obtaining a debt restructuring order.106 
He complied with the order until 8 July 2011 by making payment to the 
distribution agent; thereafter he failed to make further payments.107 The debt 
arising from these credit agreements prescribed three years later on 8 July 
2014.108 On 3 October 2014, after the debts had already prescribed and 
about five months before section 126B of the NCA came into operation, the 
                                            
101  Saner Prescription in South African Law para 3.3.7. Also see below in this paragraph 
the discussion of the minority judgment in Kaknis 20. 
102  For a detailed discussion, see Saner Prescription in South African Law para 3.3.7 
and the authorities cited; also see Loubser "JC de Wet and the Theory of Extinctive 
Prescription" 424-425 for a discussion on the anticipatory waiver of prescription. 
103  Section 90(2)(a)(i) and (ii) of the NCA.  
104  See Bracher 2017 https://www.financialinstitutionslegalsnapshot.com/2017/02/ 
section-126b1b-of-the-national-credit-act-is-not-retrospective. 
105  Kaknis v Absa Bank Limited; Kaknis v Man Financial Services SA (Pty) Ltd 2017 4 
SA 17 (SCA). 
106  Kaknis paras 1-3, 33. 
107  Kaknis para 4. 
108  Kaknis para 4. 
M KELLY-LOUW & P STOOP  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  21 
consumer signed an acknowledgment of debt with his two credit providers, 
but defaulted on the acknowledgment of debt again and made no further 
payments.109 When the credit providers issued summons and applied for 
summary judgment, the consumer argued before the court a quo (that is, 
the Eastern Cape Local Division of the High Court) that their claims had 
prescribed and he relied on section 126B of the NCA. He argued that he 
was unaware at the time that he could rely on prescription as a defence and, 
if he had been aware of it, he would not have signed the acknowledgment 
of debt. The credit providers contended that the acknowledgment of debt 
had reactivated the prescribed debt.110 The court a quo (per Msizi AJ) 
dismissed his defence and held that section 126B did not apply to any credit 
agreements concluded before 13 March 2015. The court a quo thus found 
that the debts had not prescribed and granted judgment in favour of the 
credit providers.111 
The majority judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal also concluded that 
the section did not operate retrospectively (per Van der Merwe JA with 
Mathopo JA and Nicholls AJA concurring).112 The majority held that no 
statute is to be construed as impairing vested rights which were acquired 
under existing laws, unless it is clearly intended by the Legislature for the 
statute to have that effect. It is the rule of law that a statute will affect only 
future matters. Should there be doubt regarding the retrospective effect of 
a provision, the presumption against retrospectively is rebuttable.113 The 
majority held that the consumer could rely on the benefits, protection and 
the working of the defence of prescription as stipulated in the NCA only as 
from the date that section 126B came into operation. They stressed that 
although the main purpose of the NCA is the protection of consumers, the 
consumers' rights must be balanced against the rights of credit providers.114 
The majority concluded that the acknowledgments of debt relied upon by 
the credit providers were valid and the summary judgments were correctly 
granted.115 
The minority judgment in Kaknis (per Shongwe JA with Willis JA concurring) 
is also of interest from a consumer protection perspective,116 although it is 
not binding. The minority judgment stated that it would have upheld the 
appeal and the court a quo had minimised the protection of consumers and 
"overemphasised the protection and undue compromise of certainty in 
                                            
109  paras 5 and 33. 
110  Kaknis paras 5, 7, 34 and 35. 
111  Kaknis para 6. 
112  See the full judgment in Kaknis paras 32-41. 
113  Kaknis paras 37-39. 
114  Kaknis para 38. 
115  Kaknis paras 40-41. 
116  See the judgment of the minority in Kaknis paras 1-27. 
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commercial transactions".117 The minority stressed that the intention of the 
legislature in introducing section 126B of the NCA was evident in "that it 
sought to protect consumers in general, but more particularly the naive and 
vulnerable ones" and was included for good reason, most probably because 
consumers, unaware of the law regarding prescription, were held liable for 
old debts enforced by debt collectors, buyers of prescribed debt or credit 
providers.118 According to the minority, section 126B intended to:119 
… cure a situation where a debt which had become prescribed, the credit 
provider should not benefit from a debt which had become prescribed because 
the ‘poor’ consumer is unaware of the defence of prescription. If the consumer 
would reasonably have raised the defence of prescription had he … been 
aware of such a defence, section 126B would come to the consumer's rescue 
in order to prevent unfairness or injustice, which would have [befallen] the 
‘poor’ consumer. 
The minority also considered the application of section 126B and made 
useful and valid comments regarding the parameters of this section.120 
According to the minority, the prohibition of the collection or reactivation of 
debt is not absolute and certain requirements must be present for it to 
apply.121 For instance, the defence of prescription ought to be raised in 
response to a demand by the credit provider (or debt collector) and this 
could be done at any time, even during opposition to a summary judgment, 
as in the case before the court. If the consumer was aware of the defence 
of prescription, he should raise it, but if he was unaware the consumer must 
prove that he would "reasonably have raised" the defence.122 The 
prescription period must have ended and the consumer must not have been 
responsible for preventing the credit provider from knowing of the debt. 
Furthermore, the consumer must not have acknowledged liability for the 
debt during the running of the prescription period, as provided for in section 
14 of the Prescription Act, which would have interrupted the running of 
prescription and there must also not be present other circumstances set out 
in section 13 of the Prescription Act that would have delayed the operation 
of prescription. A consumer should also not have waived the defence of 
prescription. Section 126B(1)(b)(ii) in a nutshell extends the protection of 
the defence of prescription to consumers who are not aware of the existence 
of the defence. Should the consumer be made aware of the defence, for 
example, by the credit provider, this protection "falls away, as they would 
have waived the defence".123 
                                            
117  Kaknis para 23. 
118  Kaknis para 18. 
119  Kaknis para 18. 
120  Kaknis paras 19 and 20. 
121  Kaknis para 19. 
122  Kaknis para 19. 
123  Kaknis para 20. 
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The minority stated that if section 126B did not apply retrospectively, then 
the legislature failed to reconcile the trend set by the Constitutional Court 
where it stressed the protection of the consumer.124 According to them, a 
conclusion that section 126B did not have retrospective effect would create 
an "odd situation" where credit agreements concluded prior to section 
126B’s coming into operation would offer less protection to consumers than 
those entered into after section 126B came into effect, thereby creating a 
difference between categories of consumers.125 Although the minority 
judgment acknowledged that it was common cause that section 126B did 
not expressly provide that it is intended to apply with retrospective effect, it 
stated that the question that required analysis was whether "it provides for 
retrospective application by necessary implication".126 The minority 
judgment was of the view that the principle against retrospective operation 
of law was not absolute, particularly where the consequences of holding that 
an act was non-retrospective would lead to an "absurdity or practical 
injustice".127 Although Willis JA concurred with the minority judgment, he 
also added a few additional comments in a separate judgment. The 
following is of relevance here:128 
… among the reasons we have the law of prescription is to set persons free 
from the burden of debt. The question we have to ask ourselves is whether, 
under our constitutional dispensation, it is better, in the transitional period, to 
set consumers forever free from debt that has prescribed or to allow credit 
providers the freedom to revive debt that has prescribed through the 
mechanism of ‘acknowledgement’. 
It is therefore submitted that the majority in Kaknis leaves the consumer-
credit industry with two categories of contracts to which the NCA applies 
and different rules for each category in respect of its enforceability once the 
debt has prescribed: credit agreements concluded prior to section 126B’s 
coming into operation would offer less protection to consumers than those 
entered into after section 126B came into effect, thereby creating a 
difference between categories of consumers. The majority judgment 
regarding the retrospectivity of legislation may be correct, but it is 
undesirable to have different rules for the same situation. The lack of one 
uniform rule is certainly not in the interest of consumer protection. However, 
one should always keep in mind in promoting protection and equity in the 
                                            
124  Kaknis para 23. 
125  Kaknis para 23. 
126  Kaknis para 16. 
127  See Kaknis paras 10-16, 29 and the authorities relied upon. 
128  See Kaknis para 30. 
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credit market that the rights and responsibilities of credit providers and 
consumers must be balanced to achieve sustainability.129 
Therefore, the situation of prescribed debt reactivated prior to section 126B 
of the NCA will still be governed by the Prescription Act and the common 
law as it applied before section 126B came into operation and as it still 
applies to prescribed debt in general (that is, debt not arising from a credit 
agreement governed by the NCA). This would mean that if the defence of 
prescription was not raised by the consumer and he made payment on the 
prescribed debt or made an acknowledgment of debt regarding a debt 
arising from a credit agreement governed by the NCA, prior to 13 March 
2015, such payment and/or acknowledgment would validly have revived the 
prescribed debt. However, prescribed debt under a credit agreement 
entered into after the coming into effect of section 126B cannot be collected 
or revived where, as part of legal proceedings or otherwise (in other words, 
at any stage), in response to a demand the consumer raises the defence of 
prescription, or the consumer fails to raise the defence but would reasonably 
have raised the defence of prescription had he been aware of such a 
defence. 
The Legislature aims to go one step further in its aim to prohibit the selling, 
collecting and reactivating of prescribed debt by criminalising these 
activities. The National Credit Amendment 7 of 2019 (the NCAA) has been 
signed into law but not in operation yet. Under this Act the NCA will be 
amended to provide that a contravention of section 126B(1)(a) (that is, the 
selling of prescribed debt) and (b) (that is, the collection or re-activation of 
prescribed debt) of the NCA would constitute offences punishable with a 
fine or imprisonment not exceeding 10 years or both a fine and such 
imprisonment, depending on the nature of the convicted person (for 
example, a natural person vs a juristic person). Section 25 of the NCAA 
introduces various new offences under sections 157A-D. Section 157B(2) 
states that any person who intentionally sells a prescribed debt under a 
credit agreement to which the NCA applies as contemplated in section 
126B(1)(a) is guilty of an offence. The prohibition on the selling of NCA 
debts extinguished by prescription is therefore absolute and will constitute 
an offence under section 157B(2). Section 157B(3) provides that any person 
who intentionally continues the collection of or attempts to reactivate a debt 
under the NCA under the circumstances contemplated in section 126B(1)(b) 
commits an offence. The offence will therefore be limited to the specific 
circumstances contemplated – and section 157B(3) therefore does not 
affect the nature of the prohibition in section 126B(1)(b). The collection or 
reactivation of prescribed debt may therefore still in certain circumstances 
                                            
129  See Kaknis para 21, where the court refers to Kubyana v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 
2014 3 SA 56 (CC) para 20. 
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not constitute an offence (see, above, the discussion of the specific qualified 
circumstances in section 126B(1)(b)). Under the amended section 161 of 
the NCA a contravention of section 157B is liable to a fine or imprisonment 
not exceeding ten years or both, or if the convicted person is not a natural 
person, to a fine not exceeding ten per cent of the annual turnover or R1 
million, whichever amount is the greatest. A contravening credit provider 
would also run the risk that it could lose its registration as a credit provider 
with the National Credit Regulator. The criminalisation of selling prescribed 
debt under the NCA or the collection or attempted re-activation of prescribed 
debt under the NCA under the circumstances contemplated in section 
126B(1)(b) is to be welcomed from the perspective of consumer protection. 
One concern, however, is that a consumer in certain instances may abuse 
the defence of prescription simply to delay proceedings: will a credit 
provider, for example, still be able to enforce debt after a court finds that a 
debt has not prescribed and that section 126B has not been transgressed? 
5 Section 86A of the NCAA and prescription  
The NCAA aims to introduce by way of section 86A a special "debt 
intervention" mechanism applicable to certain consumers under certain 
circumstances.130 One of the consequences of debt intervention is that a 
credit agreement may be suspended for a fixed period of time. To deal with 
the running of prescription regarding a debt arising from such a credit 
agreement during the time of its suspension, the NCAA aims to introduce 
section 87A(4)(b) in the NCA to interrupt/delay prescription.131 The 
proposed section 87A(4)(b) provides that: 
… if the period of prescription in respect of a suspended credit agreement 
would be completed before or on, or within one year after the day on which 
the suspension ended, the period of prescription shall not be completed before 
a year has elapsed after the day on which the suspension ended. 
6  Proposed changes to the prescription of debt by the 
South African Law Reform Commission made in their 
draft Prescription Bill 
The South African Law Reform Commission (hereafter the Law 
Commission) embarked on a project to harmonise the existing laws 
providing for different prescription periods and to overhaul the current 
Prescription Act and the Institution of Legal Proceedings against Certain 
Organs of State Act.132 As part of the Law Reform Commission's project it 
                                            
130  For criticism of debt intervention and the resulting suspension of a credit agreement, 
see Sonnekus 2018 TSAR 407-427. 
131  See s 15 of the Amendment Act. 
132  See SALRC Harmonisation of Existing Laws. 
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published a draft Prescription Bill (hereafter draft Prescription Bill) and a 
draft Institution of Legal Proceedings against Certain Organs of State 
Amendment Bill. The Law Reform Commission accepted public comments 
on their draft Bills until 31 August 2018, and it remains to be seen if their 
work will develop into new legislation. 
We will focus on only a selection of the proposed changes to the 
Prescription Act made by the Law Commission in their draft Prescription Bill 
which is likely to affect the consumer-credit industry. The time periods after 
which the different types of debts prescribe remain largely the same in the 
draft Prescription Bill, except for the increased prescription period for 
unsecured credit from three to four years.133 
Clause 14 of the draft Prescription Bill provides that the voluntary payment 
by a consumer of a prescribed debt does not revive prescribed debt under 
any circumstances. To protect the autonomy of a party who wants to clear 
his good name, clause 14 recognises the payment of prescribed debt as 
payment, but only if it was made voluntarily by the consumer without his 
being induced by the credit provider to do so. However, despite this, the 
clause stipulates that the payment will still not constitute the revival of the 
prescribed debt. The clause also allows the consumer to recover any 
payments made in the aforementioned circumstances and where it is 
established that the consumer was not indebted to the credit provider. This 
is contrary to the current situation, discussed above, where the Prescription 
Act allows for the revival of prescribed debt generally by a consumer's 
payment of such a debt and the consumer is prohibited from reclaiming the 
payment made on the prescribed debt.134 Although section 126B of the NCA 
prohibits credit providers from reactivating or collecting prescribed debt 
arising from a credit agreement governed by the NCA, the voluntary 
activation of consumers is still permitted that would reactivate the prescribed 
debt, provided, of course, that the consumer was aware of the defence of 
prescription and chose not to invoke the defence.135  
In alignment with the objective of section 126B of the NCA, clause 13(2) of 
the draft Prescription Bill provides that a person may not cede, transfer or 
recover a prescribed debt. 
At present, prescription generally needs to be raised in pleadings as a 
defence,136 except where the debt is regulated by section 126B of the NCA, 
where a slightly different situation prevails, as contemplated in section 
                                            
133  Clause 15(1)(d) of the draft Prescription Bill. 
134  Section 10(3) read with s 14(1) of the Prescription Act. 
135  See the discussion above in para 4 and the view of the minority in Kaknis expressed 
in paras 19 and 20 regarding the application of s 126B of the NCA. 
136  Section 17 of the Prescription Act. 
M KELLY-LOUW & P STOOP  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  27 
126B(b)(ii) – when a consumer would reasonably have raised the defence 
of prescription had the consumer been aware of such a defence, in 
response to a demand, whether as part of legal proceedings or otherwise.137 
It seems as if a presiding officer has a discretion to consider prescription as 
a defence without its being specifically raised if "the consumer would 
reasonably have raised the defence of prescription had the consumer been 
aware of such a defence" (own emphasis added). The meaning of the 
aforementioned phrase is still uncertain and it remains to be seen what 
impact it is going to have on section 17 of the Prescription Act. The draft 
Prescription Bill will, however, clear up any uncertainty. The draft 
Prescription Bill apparently aims to change the need to specifically raise the 
defence of prescription and provides in clause 13(4) for a court during 
judicial proceedings to consider if a debt has prescribed. Clause 20(1) goes 
a step further and states that a court "must consider the question of 
prescription". A court therefore has to consider the question of prescription 
without a party’s specifically raising it. 
Clause 13(4) provides for specific additional orders a court may make where 
the debt has prescribed. It makes provision for the court to order: 
(a)  the repayment of amounts recovered on prescribed debt;138  
(b)  the payment of compensation for any loss or damage suffered pursuant 
to the recovery, including any loss or damage incurred:139 
(i) through the use of force, intimidation, the making of fraudulent or 
misleading representations or the spreading of false information 
relating to the creditworthiness of an affected person; 
(ii) through other conduct amounting to a contravention of a code of 
conduct that a person is obliged to comply with in terms of any 
law; or 
(iii) because of any other impropriety or unlawful conduct. 
Clause 13(4) together with clause 20 seems to imply that a court would have 
to take prescription into consideration when dealing with a debt governed 
by the draft Prescription Bill, irrespective of whether it was raised as a 
defence by the consumer. There would be a similar situation, for instance, 
where the court seemingly decides on its own during any court proceedings 
concerning a credit agreement falling within the scope of the NCA whether 
                                            
137  Also see the discussion in para 4 above on the uncertainty about the meaning of s 
126B(1)(b)(ii) of the NCA. 
138  Clause 13(4)(a) of the draft Prescription Bill. 
139  Clause 13(4)(b) of the draft Prescription Bill. 
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the credit involved was granted recklessly140 (or whether the statutory in 
duplum rule applies to the debt).141 
The consumer bears the onus of proving that a debt that a credit provider is 
trying to recover has prescribed,142 while the credit provider will bear the 
burden of proving that the prescription was interrupted (for example, by way 
of an acknowledgment of liability) or that the consumer waived or renounced 
his right of relying on prescription.143 The draft Prescription Bill suggests an 
entire shift of this general burden of proof on a consumer. In terms of the 
draft Prescription Bill a consumer does not have to allege and prove 
prescription. In clause 20(1) it provides that a credit provider trying to 
recover a debt through legal proceedings bears the onus of proving that the 
debt has not prescribed and the credit provider must also deal with the 
question of prescription in his relevant document filed of record in the 
proceedings. 
The draft Prescription Bill in clause 13(5) also makes it possible for a 
consumer affected by prescription to report the matter (for instance, the 
collection of prescribed debt) to the Regulatory Authority (for example, the 
National Credit Regulator) in terms of certain pieces of legislation such as 
the NCA. This clause merely correlates with the proposed sections in the 
pending National Credit Amendment Act 7 of 2019, which provides that any 
contravention of section 126B would constitute an offence.144 
At present either an express or tacit acknowledgment of debt (liability) 
interrupts the running of prescription.145 This entails that the 
acknowledgment of debt does not have to be in writing. In this regard, a 
proposal has been made by way of clause 18 in the draft Prescription Bill 
which provides that interruption by the acknowledgment of debt must be 
unequivocal and in writing. This is in stark contrast to the current position, 
where allowance is made for acknowledgments also to be made orally or 
tacitly. Of course the challenge with an oral acknowledgment lies in its 
evidentiary proof. 
7  A few observations and conclusions  
The Law Reform Commission in their Harmonisation of Existing Law 
acknowledges that although prescription is rooted in a pre-constitutional era 
and its rules inherently limit other rights, it remains a rational and legitimate 
                                            
140  Section 83(1) of the NCA. 
141  Section 103(5) of the NCA; also see Kelly-Louw "Debt Relief and Insolvency" 162. 
142  Section 17(2) of the Prescription Act. 
143  Also see Saner Prescription in South African Law para 3.3.16. 
144  See the discussion in para 4 above. 
145  Section 14(1) of the Prescription Act. 
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instrument of legal engineering aimed at regulating the periods within which 
rights must be enforced in order to balance the interests of debtors, the 
public and creditors.146 It has been indicated above that the prescription of 
debt that arises from a credit agreement governed by the NCA is jointly 
governed by the NCA and the Prescription Act. The NCA has recently been 
amended and a draft Prescription Bill has been published. 
Section 126B of the NCA was introduced to curb the abusive practice that 
existed at the time, where credit providers and/or debt collectors were 
continuously selling or collecting prescribed debt and tricked consumers, 
who were unaware of the law regarding prescription, into making payments 
on their prescribed debts in order to reactivate these debts. Section 
126B(1)(b) at first sight seems to make it impossible to collect or reactivate 
a prescribed debt that falls under the NCA. However, there are two 
qualifications to the prohibition in section 126B(1)(b): a person may not 
collect or reactivate a debt if the debt has prescribed in terms of the 
Prescription Act; and where the consumer in fact raises the defence of 
prescription or would reasonably have raised the defence had he been 
aware of the defence, in response to a demand or as part of legal 
proceedings. Section 126B(1)(b) therefore does not contain an absolute 
prohibition: it does not prohibit the acceptance of payment by the credit 
provider of a prescribed debt under section 10(3) of the Prescription Act, 
and if a consumer is aware of the defence of prescription but deliberately 
fails to invoke it under section 17 of the Prescription Act. 
Currently prescription generally needs to be raised in pleadings as a 
defence,147 except where the debt is regulated by section 126B of the NCA, 
where a slightly different situation prevails as contemplated in section 
126B(b)(ii) – when a consumer would reasonably have raised the defence 
of prescription had the consumer been aware of such a defence, in 
response to a demand, whether as part of legal proceedings or otherwise.148 
In terms of section 126B(b)(ii) a presiding officer has a discretion to consider 
prescription as a defence without its being specifically raised if "the 
consumer would reasonably have raised the defence of prescription had the 
consumer been aware of such a defence" (own emphasis added). The 
meaning of the aforementioned phrase is still uncertain, so it remains to be 
seen what impact it is going to have on section 17 of the Prescription Act. 
The draft Prescription Bill will, however, clear up any uncertainty. The draft 
Prescription Bill aims to change the need to specifically raise the defence of 
prescription and provides in clause 13(4) for a court during judicial 
                                            
146  SALRC Harmonisation of Existing Laws xiii. 
147  Section 17 of the Prescription Act. 
148  Also see the discussion in para 4 above on the uncertainty about the meaning of s 
126B(1)(b)(ii) of the NCA. 
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proceedings to consider if a debt has prescribed. Clause 20(1) goes a step 
further and states that a court "must consider the question of prescription". 
A court therefore has to consider the question of prescription without a 
party’s specifically raising it. 
In Kaknis v Absa Bank Limited; Kaknis v Man Financial Services SA (Pty) 
Ltd the Supreme Court of Appeal considered whether section 126B of the 
NCA applied retrospectively. The majority concluded that the section did not 
operate retrospectively, while the minority held that the principle against the 
retrospective operation of law was not absolute, particularly where the 
consequences of holding that an act was non-retrospective would lead to 
an "absurdity or practical injustice". The majority in Kaknis leaves the 
consumer-credit industry with two categories of contracts to which the NCA 
applies and different rules for each category in respect of its enforceability 
once the debt has prescribed: credit agreements concluded prior to section 
126B’s coming into operation would offer less protection to consumers than 
those entered into after section 126B. This therefore creates a difference 
between categories of consumers. Although the majority judgment 
regarding the retrospectivity of legislation may be correct, it is undesirable 
to have different rules for the same situation. 
The protection offered by section 126B is to be welcomed. Regulation of the 
practices of the selling of prescribed debt and its collection or reactivation 
has been long overdue. Section 126B also offers much-needed protection 
to consumers, especially those being unaware of the prescription defence, 
and allows them to raise the defence at any time. This is in contrast to the 
Prescription Act that requires the consumer to be aware of prescription and 
to specifically raise it as a defence when faced with a demand for payment 
in order to gain the benefits of it. It may at this stage create uncertainty for 
credit providers where a consumer has already made a payment on a 
prescribed debt. However, more certainty will be brought about with the 
coming into operation of the draft Prescription Bill, which provides that a 
court should always consider prescription irrespective of whether or not it 
was raised as a defence by the consumer. 
The criminalisation of the selling of prescribed debt under the NCA or the 
collection or attempted re-activation of prescribed debt under the NCA 
under the circumstances contemplated in section 126B(1) by the NCAA is 
to be welcomed from the perspective of consumer protection. The draft 
Prescription Bill correlates with the criminalisation of contraventions of 
section 126B. Clause 13(5) of the draft Prescription Bill also makes it 
possible for a consumer affected by prescription to report the matter (for 
instance, the collection of prescribed debt) to the Regulatory Authority (for 
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example, the National Credit Regulator) in terms of certain pieces of 
legislation such as the NCA.  
It is therefore clear from the above that the while the NCA continues to 
regulate or prohibit certain behaviour in relation to prescribed debts, the 
Prescription Act still regulates prescription periods and prescription in 
general. An overlap of these pieces of legislation is likely to occur. The 
pending amendment of the NCA and the Prescription Act are at this stage 
well aligned, specifically on the criminalisation of certain behaviour. 
However, it remains to be seen what the impact of section 126B will be, and 
more specifically what the impact on the credit industry will be of the 
criminalisation of contraventions of section 126B. 
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